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Food
Safety,
South-North
Asymmetries, and the Clash of
Regulatory Regimes
Obijiofor Aginam*
GIVE US THIS DAY OUR DAILY BREAD... The prayer is thus not
purely a collection of spiritual recitals ....It turns ... to the mundane
requirements of food, clothing, shelter-what would, in human rights
parlance, be called economic rights.... We must also take account of
the word "daily." There is here a clear injunction against anti-social
conduct such as hoarding or cornering the market in essential
commodities.
1

- C.G Weeramantry

ABSTRACT

This Article explores the globalization of food safety
concerns driven by the phenomenon of economic globalization,
and the "legalization" of food safety disputes within the rulesbased architecture of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Focusing on the interaction between WTO norms and the
treaties of other multilateralorganizations,the Article discusses
the implications of the "clash of food safety regulatory regimes"
for South-North asymmetrical relations between the rich and
poor countries. The Article also discusses global economic
* Ph.D., Associate Professor of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa,
Canada (on
leave); Director of Studies, Policy and Institutional Frameworks, United Nations
University centre, Tokyo, Japan. This Article is based on a paper the Author presented
at a symposium, "From Hand to Mouth, Via the Lab and the Legislature: International
and Domestic Regulations to Secure the Food Supply," organized by the Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law, February 16, 2007, Vanderbilt University Law School,
Nashville, Tennessee, USA. The Author would like to thank Jamie Allyson Lang and
the other members of the Board of Editors for an invitation to the symposium. The
Author would like to acknowledge the comments and questions on his presentation by
the other invited speakers, Vanderbilt law school students and professors, and other
participants in the symposium. However, the Author is responsible for any
shortcomings in the Article. This Article is inspired, in many ways, by a broader
research project that the Author is presently undertaking on aspects of human
security, trade, and global governance of public health in an interdependent world that
is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
1.
C. G. Weeramantry, On Earth as it is in Heaven: A Vision of World Order
for the 21st Century, 2 TUL. J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 176-77 (1995).

1099

1100

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40:1099

diplomacy and the emerging WTO jurisprudence on the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS)
disputes. This Article explores both the perceived and actual
marginalization of most developing and least-developed
countries by the embedded structural impediments and onerous
obligations in food safety disputes. The Article discusses the
European Union's embargo on fresh fish from East African
countries following a cholera outbreak and argues for mutually
reinforcing linkages between the SPS and pre-existing foodsafety-related norms, standards, and agreements of other
multilateral organizations, including the emerging "norm" of
the precautionaryprinciple.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CRUX OF THE ARGUMENT

The globalization of food safety and health concerns, partly
driven by the phenomenon of economic globalization and the
"legalization" of food safety disputes within the rules-based
architecture of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has raised
complex regulatory questions within the mandate of relevant
international organizations. This clash of food safety and health
regulatory regimes implicates the South-North 2 asymmetrical
relations between the rich and poor countries, global economic
diplomacy, and the emerging jurisprudence of the WTO on the

2.
The Author uses the term "South-North" throughout this Article as
suggested by Ivan Head. Ivan L. Head, ON A HINGE OF HISTORY: THE MUTUAL
VULNERABILITY OF SOUTH AND NORTH 7 passim (1991). Head preferred "South-North"
as a more accurate reflection of the current international system because "North-South
is itself misleading for it lends weight to the impression that the South is the
diminutive." Id at 14.
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Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS)3
disputes.
This Article explores both the perceived and actual
marginalization of most developing countries, especially those in
Africa, by the embedded structural impediments and onerous
obligations in food safety disputes. A litany of seminal works on the
transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
to the WTO in 1995 documents well how a legally enforceable
dispute-settlement procedure transformed the international trade
architecture from trade in goods to trade in services, intellectual
4
property, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Although the multiple dynamics of the rules-based international
trade architecture built on the institutional pillars of the WTO have
been intensely debated by academic scholars and global civil society
groups, 5 the real question is no longer whether free trade is good or
bad for countries, but rather whether the contemporary rules of free
trade are fair, humane, transparent, and even-handed in the context
of South-North asymmetries.
Has the scope of global trade
agreements extended and intruded into areas and sectors that
impede social policy in the national domain of countries? Did the
"single undertaking" package, in which every member accepted all
WTO agreements, enclose the domestic policy space, especially in
developing countries, for certain aspects of social policy and provision
of public goods? In adjudicating disputes, do the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the WTO create effective and mutually-reinforcing
linkages between the SPS and the pre-existing and related foodsafety norms, standards, and agreements of other multilateral
organizations-including the emerging "norms" of the precautionary
principle and sustainable development? This Article explores these

3.
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994,Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994)
[hereinafter SPS].
4.
See, e.g., JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1997) (examining the elaborate rules which

govern international economic relations in the wake of the Uruguay Round); MICHAEL
J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d

ed.1999) (comparing and contrasting various aspects of international trade, with
special attention paid to the transition from GATT to the WTO and the resulting rules'
effect on areas such as agriculture, intellectual property, environment, and domestic
health regulation).
5.
See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 4, at 319-37 (looking at weaknesses of
international trade policy insofar as it applies to developing countries). But cf.
CATHERINE BUTTON, THE POWER TO PROTECT: TRADE, HEALTH AND UNCERTAINTY IN

THE WTO (2004) (examining the intersection of WTO trade rules and domestic health
protection regimes); TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4 (charting the development of
the WTO and the multiple areas of trade affected by the new rules of international
trade); Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329 (2000) (discussing the WTO's

constraints on domestic regulation in the context of food safety).
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questions in the context of the food safety disputes at the WTO
involving the SPS Agreement, the perceived or real marginalization
of developing countries in these disputes, and the paradoxical
convergence and collapse of existing international norms in SPS
disputes and WTO law.
The Article is divided into five Parts. Part I gives an overview of
the globalization of food safety concerns due to
the argument:
economic globalization raises complex regulatory questions in the
context of South-North asymmetries. Part II presents an overview of
the SPS Agreement, which came into force with the establishment of
6
The
the WTO as one of the Uruguay Round trade agreements.
overview focuses on the most "controversial" provisions of the SPS
Agreement on risk assessment and scientific evidence for domestic
SPS measures. Part II also argues that the enforcement of the SPS,
through the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms at the WTO, is
problematic because of the lack of a "cohesive, epistemic community
on issues of transnational biotechnology." 7 Focusing on some of the
SPS disputes that have been adjudicated by the WTO dispute
settlement panels and appellate bodies, Part III explores the actual or
perceived marginalization of pre-existing food-safety related norms
and agreements by the WTO. Deploying what the Author refers to as
the "paradoxical convergence and divergence of norms and
conventions on trade-related issues," Part III assesses the interaction
of the SPS Agreement, the Codex Alimentarius Commission's
standards on food safety established by the World , Health
Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization
Leading
(FAO), and the Convention on Biological Diversity.
international law scholars have explored the convergence and
divergence of these norms under the rubric of "fragmentation of
international law."' 8 Part IV discusses the import ban on fresh fish
imposed by the European Community (EC) on East African countries
prompted by outbreaks of cholera in those countries. Given that the
EC ban was not based on any scientific evidence that would make the

6.
SPS, supra note 3.
7.
Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and InternationalLaw, 42 HARv. INT'L L. J.
47, 135 (2001).
See, e.g., Chairman of the Study Group on Fragmentation of Int'l Law,
8.
Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, delivered to the Int'l Law Comm'n, UN Doc.
A/CN.4JL.682 (Aug. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation of International Law UN
Report] (issuing recommendations to assist in solving the problems which result from
disparities between legal regimes); G. Abi-Saab, Fragmentationor Unification: Some
Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919 (1999) (noting fragmentation
inherent in the lack of a centralized "judicial power"); John Jackson, Fragmentationor
Unification Among International Institutions: The World Trade Organization, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 823 (1999) (examining fragmentation of international law
specifically in the context of the WTO).
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ban SPS compliant, the Author argues that the ban exemplifies the
South-North asymmetry between rich and poor nations. 9 These East
African countries lacked the capacity to challenge the EC before the
WTO because they had an insignificant share of international trade
compared to the EC.10 Part V concludes by "problematizing" the
challenges of humanizing food safety concerns at the WTO in the
context of South-North disparities. The time has come for the WTO
to address the "democratic deficit" that is created by the enforcement
of free trade rules on food safety issues. One way to do this is to take
pragmatic steps towards implementing the various provisions of
trade agreements that codify the principle of "Special and Differential
Treatment" for developing and least developed member countries of
the WTO.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE SPS AGREEMENT
The SPS is one of the Uruguay Round trade agreements
negotiated alongside the establishment of the WTO in 1995.11 The
preamble to the SPS Agreement re-affirms that no Member of the
WTO "should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to
the requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail
or a disguised restriction on international trade. ' 12
The SPS
Agreement seeks to establish "a multilateral framework of rules and
disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their
negative effects on trade.' 1 3 The SPS Agreement also desires to
"further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures
between Members, on the basis of international standards, guidelines
and recommendations developed by the relevant international
organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant international and
regional organizations operating within the framework of the
International Plant Protection Convention, without requiring

9.
SPS, supra note 3, art. 2.2 (verifying that the SPS requires scientific
grounds for bans); Press Release, Food and Agric. Org.of the U.N., FAO: Import Ban on
Fish Products From Africa "Not the Most Appropriate Answer," PR 98/21 (Mar. 25,
1998) [hereinafter FAO Import Ban] (asserting that the WTO's ban was scientifically
unsupported).
10.
Amin Alavi, African Countries and the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, 25 DEV. POLY REV. 25, 34 (2007).
11.
SPS, supranote 3.
12.
Id. pmbl. 1.
13.
Id.
4.
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Members to change their appropriate level of protection of human,
14
animal or plant life or health."
Like most WTO agreements, the SPS Agreement attempts to
draw a line of distinction between protectionism and genuine
domestic measures and policies necessary to protect human, animal,
or plant life or health. 15 This balance is always delicate given the
long list of disputes over the interpretation of Article XX(b) of GATT
16
1994 heard by various WTO Panels as well as its Appellate Body.
Thus far, in the WTO jurisprudence on food safety disputes, the most
contentious issues on the SPS seem to revolve around the "Basic
Rights and Obligations of WTO Members" in Article 2, the
harmonization of national and relevant international SPS measures
in Article 3, and the requirement of risk assessment in Article 5.17
WTO members, under Article 2, shall ensure that any sanitary and
phytosanitary measure is applied to the extent necessary to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health; is based on scientific
principles; and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,
except as provided in paragraph 7 of Article 5.1S Article 2(3) codifies

14.
Id.
6.
15.
See M. Trebilcock & J. Soloway, International Trade Policy and Domestic
Food Safety Regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body Under the SPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 537 (Daniel L.M.
Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) (discussing the SPS's intended balance
between protectionism and genuinely protective policies); Howse, supra note 5
(defending the SPS provisions as mechanisms which enhance rational democratic
deliberation as to what constitutes risk and how risk can be controlled).
16.
See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 397-98 (discussing Article
XX(b) of GATT 1994); see also WHO and WTO Secretariat, WTO Agreements and
Public Health: A Joint Study by the WHO and WTO Secretariat,at 30-31, VII-20026,000 (Aug. 20, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-elbooksp-e/
who wto-e.pdf (demonstrating the importance that the WTO has always placed on
health exceptions by listing the forms those exceptions take in different treaties,
including GATT's Article XX(b)); BUTTON, supra note 5, at 24-41 (suggesting that,
despite its textual limitations, Article XX(b) was interpreted such that it offered
protections parallel to those of the SPS); ROBERT HOWSE & MAKAU MUTUA,
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 11-12 (2000) (explaining Article XX's justification of measures
that would normally be incompatible with GATT, if such measures can be defended
from the perspective of particular public policy needs).
17.
TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 145-47 (discussing the contentious
provisions of the SPS in detail); see also id. at 155-60 (detailing important WTO
Panel/Appellate Body decisions surrounding interpretations of SPS provisions).
18.
SPS, supra note 3, art. 5.7.
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant international
organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the
additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and
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the well-known Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle by providing
that "Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between
On
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail."19
harmonization of SPS measures, Article 3 provides:
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a
basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations,
where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement,
and in particular in paragraph 3.
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international
standards, guidelines or recommendations shall' be deemed to be
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and
presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement and of GATT 1994.
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a
scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of
Article 5.020 Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in
a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that which
would be achieved by measures based on international standards,
guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other
provision of this Agreement.
4. Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in
the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in
particular the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International
Office of Epizootics, and the international and regional organizations
operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection
Convention, to promote within these organizations the development
and periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with
21
respect to all aspects of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.

Because of the complexity of risk assessment requirements in
SPS disputes, the SPS Agreement has detailed provisions on such

review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time.
19.
20.

Id. art. 2.3.
Note 2 of the SPS Agreement appears here. The text of the Note reads:

For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if,
on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific
information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a
Member determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection.
Id. art. 3.3 n.2.
21.
Id. art. 3.1-3.4.
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assessment. Article 5(1) provides that WTO "members shall ensure
that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to
human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations." 22 In assessing risks, member states "shall take into
account available scientific evidence; relevant processes and
production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing
methods; prevalence of specific diseases or pests; the existence of
pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental
conditions; and quarantine or other treatment. '23 Article 5(3) further
provides that
in assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and determining
the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection from such risk, Members shall
take into account as relevant economic factors: the potential damage in
terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of control or
eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative
24
cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks.

When "determining the appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection," WTO members shall "take into account the
objective of minimizing negative trade effects. '25 On the need for
consistency in various SPS measures of various WTO members,
Article 5(5) provides:
[W]ith the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or
health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions
in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if
such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade. Members shall cooperate in the Committee, in
accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to develop
guidelines to further the practical implementation of this provision. In
developing the guidelines, the Committee shall take into account all
relevant factors, including the exceptional character of human health
26
risks to which people voluntarily expose themselves.

The other SPS provisions on risk assessment require member
states to maintain the least trade-restrictive SPS measures 27 and,
"where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient," to

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
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provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant
international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary
measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members
shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary
28
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.

Article 5(8) provides that:
when a Member has reason to believe that a specific sanitary or
phytosanitary measure introduced or maintained by another Member is
constraining, or has the potential to constrain, its exports and the
measure is not based on the relevant international standards,
guidelines or recommendations, or such standards, guidelines or
recommendations do not exist, an explanation of the reasons for such
sanitary or phytosanitary measure may be requested and shall be
29
provided by the Member maintaining the measure.

Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, addressing risk assessment, is
one of the most detailed and controversial articles in the SPS
Agreement and has been the subject of almost all SPS disputes at the
WTO since 1995.30 This is partly because risk is extremely difficult to
regulate effectively. Risk regulation in the context of trade-related
food safety disputes is often driven by cultural differences in a
multicultural world, as well as human manipulation of nature
through the use of emerging biotechnology. These motivations often
bump into the domain of the precautionary principle and uncertainty,
especially when science does not have definitive and conclusive
31
answers. Despite the seminal works of the leading scholars on risk,
there does not appear to be any consensus on how risk regulation
Additional
should balance risk, precaution, and uncertainties.
lacunas exist in the international legal context: a comprehensive
international treaty on risk and biotechnology is lacking, and no
consensus exists on the obligatory character of the normative
provisions of international environmental laws that codify the timehallowed principle of precaution.3 2 The implications of these voids, as

28.
Id. art. 5.7.
Id. art. 5.8.
29.
30.
See Trebilcock & Soloway, supra note 15, at 557-58 (detailing the
contentious history of SPS art. 5).
31.
See, e.g., ULRICH BECK, ECOLOGICAL POLITICS IN AN AGE OF RISK (1988)
(noting that ecological risks pose problems which require a new system of risk
management); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1986)
(hypothesizing modern industrial society's increasing need for complex risk
calculations); NATURE, RISK AND RESPONSBILITY: DISCOURSES OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
(Patrick O'Mahony ed., 1999) (examining the effect of biotechnology on pre-existing
risk calculations); CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLES (2005) (rejecting the "precautionary principle" and re-evaluating the
interactions between fear, danger and the law).
32.
For an insightful analysis of the tensions between food safety, risk
assessment, and the precautionary principle, see generally BUTTON, supra note 5;
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Murphy observed, are the lack of a "cohesive, epistemic community on
issues of transnational biotechnology. ' 33 This has left the regime of
the WTO as the undisputed champion to address the issue of trade
bans, but with only "limited ability to assess the scientific basis of
those bans." 34 Murphy rightly concluded that the WTO regime
[i]sa reactive regime, closely scrutinizing trade restrictions (and
typically striking down those purportedly based on environmental
concerns). It is unable to consider broader issues, such as the fairness
of allowing developed states to export genetically modified products
derived from materials of developing states. Other global regimes,
embodied in the WIPO, the FAO, or the UNDP, have limited resources
35
and a limited mandate to effect change in this area.

36
Focusing on the recent WTO panel's ruling in the EC-Biotech
dispute that characterized a broad range of health and environmental
concerns as risks of an SPS nature, Peel observed that such thinking
has "potential implications for the inter-relationship between the SPS
Agreement, TBT Agreement, and GATT" within the WTO, as well as
the relationship "between the WTO and overlapping environmental
regimes." 3 7 The actual or perceived marginalization of these other
global regimes by or within the WTO regime-a phenomenon that
leading international lawyers have explored as "fragmentation" of the
discipline 3 8 -is addressed in the next section as the "clash of
regulatory regimes."

KERRY H. WHITESIDE, PRECAUTIONARY POLITICS:
PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN
CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (2006) (comparing European and American
applications of the precautionary principle in the area of environmental risk); Michele
D. Carter, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer
Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625 (1997)
(examining the growth hormones dispute in context of the SPS framework); Gregory N.
Mandel & James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus The Precautionary
Principle: Beyond Cass Sunstein's Laws of Fear, 2006 ILL. L.R.1037 (2006)
(reconceptualizing the precautionary principle in light of Cass Sunstein's LAWS OF
FEAR critique); Murphy, supra note 7 (assessing the strengths and limits of existing
international laws and structures in the area of biotechnology); cf. Howse, supra note 5
(defending the SPS provisions as mechanisms which enhance rational democratic
deliberation as to what constitutes risk and how risk can be controlled).
33.
Murphy, supra note 7, at 135.
34.
Id. at 137.
35.
Id.
36.
Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, Reports of the Panel, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292fR,
WT/DS293/R (Sep. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotech Panel Report].
37.
Jacqueline Peel, A GMO by Any Other Name ... Might Be an SPS Risk:
Implicationsof Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasures
Agreement, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1009, 1012 (2007).
38.
For a discussion of fragmentation of international law, see G. Abi-Saab,
supra note 8 (affirming the possibility of a "judicial system" developing despite the
fragmentation inherent in the lack of a centralized "judicial power"); see also
Fragmentation of International Law UN Report, supra note 8 (issuing
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DISPUTES AND THE CLASH OF REGULATORY REGIMES
AT THE WTO

One hallmark of the rules-based global trading system anchored
by the governance architecture of the WTO is the supersonic
expansion of global trade from goods into services, intellectual
property, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (food safety). In
WTO jurisprudence on food safety disputes, there is a paradoxical
convergence and divergence of norms and conventions on traderelated issues: the WHO and FAO jointly-administered Codex
Alimentarius Commission standards on food safety, the UN
Convention on Biodiversity and its Biosafety Protocol, and the
Precautionary Principle in international "environmental" law, to
name just a few norms and conventions.3 9 In its first decade, the
WTO has witnessed an astronomical crystallization of immutable
trade norms and rules through its adjudicatory dispute-settlement
mechanisms. 40 This crystallization has taken place with a speed
unprecedented in the history of inter-governmental multilateral
organizations.4 1
The crystallization of these norms in WTO
jurisprudence has led to what one scholar calls "the international
enclosure movement," in which the erection of legal pillars on
immutable trade norms and principles within a global civilization is
driven by economic and corporate forces with less emphasis on
42
protection of public goods and social policy in developing countries.
In this regard, some of the reports by the Dispute Settlement
and Appellate Panels of the WTO are questionable. In the famous

recommendations to assist in solving the problems which result from disparities
between legal regimes); Jackson, supra note 8 (examining how both evolving and
existing theoretical concepts of international law apply in the context of the WTO, with
a general overview of the major sources of fragmentation).
39.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (creating "advance informed agreement" procedures
which countries use before importing or exporting "living modified organisms"
resulting from biotechnology); United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June
5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 143 (articulating a global strategy for
sustainable development); Codex Alimentarius, Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations/World Health Organization Food Standards, Current Official
Standards
(2007),
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/standard-list.do?lang=en
(detailing multiple standards for food safety as conceived by the FAO and the WHO).
One scholar of the precautionary principle in international ecology is WHITESIDE, supra
note 32. See also BECK, supra note 31 (evaluating the precautionary principle and
risk assessment in context of ecology).
40.
See JACKSON, supra note 4, at 124-27 (explaining the development and
implications of the dispute settlement process of the WTO).
41.
See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 4, at 94 (contrasting the smooth
functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system with previous and co-existing
mechanisms such as FTA and NAFTA).
42.
Peter Yu, The InternationalEnclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2007).
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Beef Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body of the WTO ruled that EC
restrictions on imported hormone-fed beef from the United States and
Canada were a violation of the SPS Agreement due to the lack of any
scientific evidence and risk assessment. 43 After the Beef Hormones
dispute, most of the subsequent cases on the SPS Agreement
44
(including Australia's quarantine regulations on the import of fish,
Japanese domestic measures on quarantine requirements for
agricultural products, 45 and Japanese requirements for imported
apples from the United States 46 ) found domestic SPS measures to be
47
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement.
These disputes arose between two or more industrialized
members of the WTO. If the same set of facts arose between an
industrialized WTO member and a developing or least-developed
member, would the dispute settlement mechanism at the WTO
provide for fair adjudication? Would the EC or United States accept
scientific evidence on which an SPS measure is based from Sierra
Leone, Haiti, or El Salvador? Where there are two conflicting pieces
of scientific evidence, or where science is not conclusive about the
health impact of certain food products, should the WTO panels
uphold the precautionary principle?
So far, in all the WTO disputes on the SPS in which the
precautionary principle has been raised, the panels have failed to
uphold it as a rule of customary international law. 48 Specifically, in
Beef Hormones, the Appellate Body of the WTO ruled that the
precautionary principle does not override the specific provisions of the
SPS Agreement. 49 In a recent study on the "Precautionary Principle
and the WTO" commissioned by the UN University and Institute of
Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS), Shaw and Schwartz concluded that

43.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/ABR (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter
ABR Beef Hormones].
44.
Appellate Body Report, Australia-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter ABR Australian Salmon].
45.
Appellate Body Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting Agricultural Products,
WTIDS76/ABR (Oct. 27, 1998) [hereinafter ABR Japan Agricultural Products II].
46.
Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of
Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter ABR Japan Apples].
47.
ABR Japan Apples, supra note 46, 203; ABR Japan Agricultural Products
II, supra note 45, 89-91; ABR Australian Salmon, supra note 44, 166.
48.
ABR Japan Apples, supra note 46,
233 (reiterating the Beef Hormones
arguments rejecting the precautionary principle); ABR Japan Agricultural Products II,
supra note 45, art. 6,
44 (noting Japan's implicit reliance on the precautionary
principle to interpret its scientific findings); ABR Beef Hormones, supra note 43,
123-25 (rejecting the argument that the precautionary principle is customary
international law, or is codified within the SPS).
49.
ABR Beef Hormones, supra note 43, 123-25 (rejecting the argument that
the precautionary principle is customary international law, or is codified within the
SPS).
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[r]ecent interpretations in the WTO of the parameters surrounding the
use of precaution . . . reveal that countries are permitted to take
precautionary measures in certain circumstances, but that they face
real challenges when defending a precautionary action before the WTO
50
Dispute Settlement Body.

As the Author has previously argued, a disturbing phenomenon
about the paradoxical convergence and collapse of multiple regulatory
regimes into SPS disputes, as well as other WTO agreements like the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), is that countries-especially the developing and leastdeveloped countries-are often compelled to abandon the obligations
they undertook in other pre-existing international regimes and
multilateral
organizations on human rights, environmental
protection, and public health. 51 In classic international law parlance,
these pre-existing obligations, going by the relevant provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, should prevail over WTO
obligations because they are first in time. 52 This appears to be the
unfortunate story of the various environmental treaties that codified
the precautionary principle.
IV.

SOUTH-NORTH ASYMMETRIES AND THE POLITICS OF TRADE AND
FOOD SAFETY DIPLOMACY

South-North asymmetries impact food safety in very complex
ways. Despite the emerging jurisprudence on the SPS Agreement,
one notorious case is the ban imposed by the EC on the importation of
fresh fish from East Africa after an outbreak of cholera in some East
53
African countries located on the River Nile Perch and Lake Victoria.
Fidler argued that "despite the firm position of WHO and the Food
and Agricultura Organization (FAO) that such import bans are not
54
justified on public health grounds", the EC kept the ban for months.
The FAO reported that the fish exports of Kenya, Mozambique,
Uganda, and Tanzania to the EC countries amounted to around
55,000 tons in 1996, which was collectively worth $230 million.5 5 For
these countries, the EC is the most important market for these

50.

SABRINA SHAW & RISA SCHWARTZ, UNU-JAS, TRADING PRECAUTION:

THE

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE WTO 11 (2005). See Peel, supra note 37, at 102528 (discussing the challenges of incorporating the precautionary principle into the SPS
Agreement). See generally BUTTON, supra note 5 (analyzing the tensions between food
safety, risk assessment, and the precautionary principle).
51.
Obijiofor Aginam, Between Life and Profit: Global Governance and the
Trilogy of Human Rights, Public Health and PharmaceuticalPatents, 31 N.C. J. INT'LL
L. & COM. REG. 901, 919 (2005-2006).
52.
Id. at 920-21.
53.
FAO Import Ban, supra note 9, 5.
54.

DAVID FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES 80 (1999).

55.

FAO Import Ban, supra note 9,

8, cited in FIDLER, supra note 54, at 80.
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products. 56 According to the FAO, the decade before 2002 witnessed
an unprecedented boom in the export of fish products for these
countries. World fish exports reached about $58.2 billion in 2002, and
African fish exports exceeded the combined export revenues derived
from key agricultural products such as coffee, tea, rubber, rice, meat,
and bananas.5 7 The economic consequences of the EC ban were,
therefore, deleterious. In the case of Uganda, as noted by Stefano
Ponte in a study for the Danish Institute for International Studies:
[F]ish exports are the second largest foreign exchange earner in
Uganda.... From an export value of just over one million US$ in 1990,
the mighty Nile Perch had earned the country over 45 million US$ just
six years later. . . . From 1997 to 2000, the industry experienced a
series of import bans, imposed by the EU on grounds of food safety.
Despite claims to the contrary, the EU did not provide scientific proof
that fish was actually 'unsafe'.
Rather the poor performance of
Uganda's regulatory and monitoring system was used as a
58
justification.

Despite the widely held view that the EU did not provide any
convincing scientific proof to support the bans, these East African
countries, whose economies suffered because of the embargo, did not
challenge the bans at the WTO for violating the SPS Agreement. 59
They lacked the capacity to file a complaint for an SPS violation
against an economic giant such as the EU. 60 This scenario plays out
with respect to almost all WTO agreements. 61 Citing Bown and
Hoekman, Alavi observed that one major obstacle to participation of
the African Group in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
including SPS disputes, is that they lack the economic muscle to
retaliate against their bigger trading partners. 62 They are mostly
small countries with an insignificant share of international trade;
63
their resulting losses would exceed any possible gains.

56.
Id.
57.
Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., FAO Fisheries Dept., The State of World
Fisheriesand Agriculture, at 6, 54 (2004).
58.
Stefano Ponte, Bans, Tests and Alchemy: Food Safety Standards and the
UgandanFish Export Industry, at ii (Danish Inst. for Int'l Studies, Working Paper No.
2005/19, 2005), available at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/PublicationsWP2005/19_spo_
banstestsalchemy.pdf.
59.
Andrew Mold, Non-Tariff Barriers-Their Prevalence and Relevance for
African Countries 13 (United Nations Econ. Comm'n for Africa, African Trade Policy
Centre, Work in Progress No. 21, Oct. 2005), available at www.uneca.org/atpcfWork%
20in%20progress/25.pdf.
60.
Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the
Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L.
861, 867-73 (2005), cited in Alavi, supra note 10, at 34.
61.
Alavi, supra note 10, at 30-31.
62.
Bown & Hoekman, supra note 60, at 863, cited in Alavi, supra note 10, at
63.
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V. EPILOGUE: TOWARDS A HUMANE FOOD SAFETY REGIME
This Article concludes by problematizing the challenges of
humanizing global food-safety concerns in the context of South-North
disparities. The "international enclosure movement" suggests that
human rights and other social values do not, at present, have
indelible fingerprints on WTO jurisprudence.6 4 The trade-related
disputes on the SPS Agreement are no different. It is true that we
live in a divided world.
The prevailing South-North economic
relations that drive trade-related food-safety disputes stand to
exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor countries, and to
sentence a sizeable percentage of vulnerable populations in the South
to the penitentiary of hunger, malnutrition, and possibly preventable
death. The weak institutions in most developing countries; the
shrinking normative and policy space for the incubation, promotion,
and distribution of public goods as a result of the globalization of
markets; and the socio-economic inequalities between countries have,
according to Rodrik, led to the dilemma of globalized markets built on
largely local institutions. 65 How then should the "democratic deficit,"
which is occasioned by accelerating economic globalization and
experienced by most developing countries or least-developed countries
of the South, be addressed? This Article argues that while free trade
is important, trade norms, rules, and principles must be humane. It
is important to recall Richard Falk's admonition:
Integrative tendencies in international life, combined with the widely
imagined future of a cyber world, ensure that a global civilization in
some form will take shape early in the twenty-first century. But this
probable world is a civilization only in a technical sense of being bound
together by a high rate of interaction and real time awareness, with
reduced relevance being attached to distance, boundaries, and the
territorial features of the domains being administered by sovereign
states. . . . The current ideological climate, with its neo-liberal
dogma . . . suggest[s] that the sort of global civilization that is taking
shape will be widely perceived, not as fulfillment of a vision of unity
and harmony, but as a dysutopian result of globalism-from-above that
66
is mainly constituted by economistic ideas and pressures.

Falk's "economistic ideas and pressures" resonate
in
Weeramantry's transplantation of the biblical "Our Lord's Prayer" in
the international legal context, where "Give us this Day Our Daily
Bread" represents a "clear injunction against anti-social conduct such

64.
Yu, supra note 42 (demonstrating the harms of the "international enclosure
movement" through the example of the WTO's TRIPs Agreement, which hurts the
ability of developing countries to address national public health crises).
65.
Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 347, 348 (Joseph Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
66.
Richard Falk, The Coming Global Civilization:Neo-Liberal or Humanist, in
LEGAL VISIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE CHRISTOPHER
WEERAMANTRY 15 (A. Anghie & G. Sturgess eds., 1998).
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as hoarding or cornering the market in essential commodities.1
This is exactly what the asymmetrical structure at the WTO in foodsafety disputes seems to perpetuate, as exemplified by the EC
embargo on fish from East African countries. This mindset of market
colonialism in South-North economic relations is irreconcilable with
the fundamental purposes of the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994-the
constituent instrument that established the WTO and provides that
the relations of WTO members in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising the standards of
living. 68
While the objective of the SPS Agreement-to strike a
balance between the protection of human life and sheer
protectionism-is infallible, science may not often have all the
answers in the face of accelerating biotechnological advancements in
the global food industry. Trade norms must therefore link neatly
with and mutually reinforce other norms and agreements that
advance human dignity. To achieve this objective, there is a need to
develop effective and universal benchmarks.
It is despicable, for
instance, that the EU, which has fought against the importation of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into European markets from
North America, 69 would ban the importation of fresh fish from East
African countries by hiding under the cover of both the SPS
Agreement and questionable scientific evidence on the correlation
between fresh fish and the cholera outbreak. 70 It is time for the WTO
to take seriously the various provisions in its agreements that codify
the Special and Differential Treatment for developing and least
developed countries, 71 especially with respect to those future foodsafety dispute scenarios that are similar to the EU-East Africa fish
ban.

67.
Weeramantry, supra note 1, at 177.
68.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
69.
See EC-Biotech Panel Report, supra note 36 (detailing and disputing the
EU's restrictions on GMO imports); Murphy, supra note 7, at 78-86 (discussing
generally the EU's hostility to GMOs and other forms of biotechnology).
70.
FAO Import Ban, supra note 9,
2, 4.
71.
See Simonetta Zarrilli, WTO Sanitary and PhytosanitaryAgreement: Issues
for Developing Countries (South Centre, Trade-Related Agenda, Dev. & Equity,
Working Paper No. 3, 1999), available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/
workingpapers/wp03.pdf; see also Ponte, supra note 58 (examining the effects on
Uganda of the EUIWTO's demands for safety standards within the fish industry);
Mandel & Gathii, supra note 32 (discussing how to balance the tension of risk analysis
and the precautionary principle in WTO disputes including the SPS).

